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INTRODUCTION
The Member States of the European Union (EU) must continue to deepen their
military cooperation. For without cooperation, their defence efforts are just not cost-
effective enough. Because of fragmentation and duplication, defence expenditure,
even as in some countries it is rising, does not yield enough employable capability.
Meanwhile the key capability shortfalls remain unaddressed. The public does expect
European governments and the EU to deal with the security challenges in and around
Europe however. So does the United States (US), whose strategic focus has pivoted
to China and the Pacific. Washington has made it clear in words and in deeds that it
will not, and cannot, solve all of Europe’s problems. The call for “strategic
autonomy”, in the new EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) of
June 2016, does not come a moment too soon.
The Brexit will not change these facts. Nor will it necessarily create any obstacle to
overcome the lack of cooperation within the EU, for the United Kingdom (UK) never
showed much inclination to pool and share its capabilities with other countries
anyway. Quite the contrary, London will now no longer be able to block the
remaining Member States from using EU institutions and Treaty provisions to the full.
It is now up to the other capitals to accelerate cooperation, and prove that they were
not conveniently hiding behind the British objections but are serious about European
defence.
In multinational capability development, the Brexit might thus even make things
easier. When it comes to deploying those capabilities for operations, it will likely not
affect the existing situation very much. The British contribution to operations under
the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has always been limited, and
the UK could still take part in operations if it wanted to, as many non-Member States
do today. More importantly, the other countries are unfortunately not that keen to
deploy troops under the CSDP either.1 In recent years operations have increasingly
been mounted by ad hoc coalitions outside the formal framework of both the EU and
NATO, without all Member States or Allies participating (even when a coalition uses
the NATO command structure). The Brexit will probably increase this tendency, even
though chances are that the UK will be so preoccupied with the fall-out of the Brexit
that its international presence will suffer – as in fact it already has ever since the
Scottish referendum forced it to focus on domestic politics.
Brexit does however greatly complicate the strategic decision-making that frames
both capability development and operations. The EUGS states that in order to
achieve the desired strategic autonomy, “a sectoral strategy, to be agreed by the
1 As a military officer put it to the author: “The current CSDP deployment of less than 3000 is hardly a
comprehensive endorsement from Member States of the military role of the EU”.2
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ments and capability priorities stemming from this Strategy”. The operational dimen-
sion of strategic autonomy comes down to the ability to act without the US (Biscop,
2015). From that follows the industrial dimension: having a defence industry that can
produce everything that this requires, notably the strategic enablers. But should the
aim now be EU strategic autonomy, without the UK, or can the aspiration still be
European strategic autonomy, with the UK? If the latter, how to involve Britain?
Either way, the implications for capability development are obvious. Furthermore,
the reasons why and the context in which actual operations take place, are often
determined by collective EU foreign policy choices, and that foreign policy will in turn
be framed by the new EUGS. This is the case even when troops are deployed by NATO
or an ad hoc coalition. Just think of NATO’s actions, under Article 5, in response to
Russian military posturing after the Ukraine crisis – in which Europe and the US got
involved as a consequence of EU decisions. Thus the question also imposes itself:
Should the UK not seek to be associated with the implementation of the EUGS
overall? And which arrangements could be imagined?
Can nothing be achieved unless all are fully involved? Or are intermediate solutions
possible? How EU Member States and the UK answer these questions will determine
which degree of strategic autonomy the EU can achieve, with which degree of British
involvement – and whether the UK itself will be left with any measure of strategic
autonomy.3
STRATEGY FIRST: WHAT ARE THE MILITARY TASKS?
The first question to answer is what exactly operational strategic autonomy means:
Which military tasks, in which parts of the world, do Europeans always need to be
able to undertake, if necessary even without the US?
The answer can be found dispersed throughout the EUGS. This dispersion was inten-
tional. Including a separate chapter on defence would in its obviousness have
provoked greater reticence on the part of the usual suspects. Instead therefore, the
defence implications of every choice were spelt out chapter by chapter. As a result
the Member States favouring a strong defence dimension actually ended up
becoming quite suspicious, fearing that defence would be drowned in a broad EUGS.
But the EUGS turned out to be one of the most ambitious EU documents on defence
to date.
The EUGS defines four major tasks for Europe’s armed forces:
First, the new task, in an EU framework, of helping to protect “the European way of
life” at home. While there is no need to duplicate NATO’s traditional collective
defence arrangements against the threat of military invasion, the EU has an increas-
ingly important role to play in addressing “challenges with both an internal and
external dimension, such as terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber and energy security,
organised crime and external border management”. In a democracy, the armed
forces are not in the lead when dealing with such threats (and neither, therefore, is
NATO), but they support the other security services and they are the last resort in
times of crisis. Such internal deployments are first and foremost a national responsi-
bility (as seen in Belgium and France after they were hit by terrorist attacks), and
indeed in legal terms CSDP operations can only take place outside the EU. But
European cooperation must nonetheless be permanently stepped up between
military and civilian intelligence services, between national and EU crisis centres,
police and judicial authorities and paramilitary forces such as gendarmerie and coast
guard, and between all of these and the armed forces (notably when the latter
operate on Europe’s borders).
This first task is essential to enable the EU to live up to the expectation inherent in
the Mutual Assistance and the Solidarity Clauses (Article 42.7 TEU and 222 TFEU):
that as a security community, the Union will protect its citizens, territory and
borders. Indeed, a strategy that would not have emphasized Europe’s own security
would have been utterly lacking in credibility at a time when public opinion is shaken
by a wave of terrorist attacks and by the refugee crisis.
Second, to contribute to “the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching
into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa”, but also, in fact, to maintain
security in the neighbourhood by forceful means when necessary. For while the4
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the military sphere, on capacity-building, the EUGS also states that the EU “will take
responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions”. In other words, the
neighbourhood is where Europeans must be prepared to undertake military crisis
management, because it is directly linked to their own security, as the fall-out of the
Syrian war has sadly demonstrated. In the neighbourhood Europeans must therefore
always be able to act, even alone, so it is the focus of the aspiration to strategic
autonomy.
That is a very ambitious aspiration, first of all because the EUGS defines a geograph-
ically much broader neighbourhood than the European Neighbourhood Policy.
Because also in this broad region capacity-building (that is designing, training and
equipping effective armed forces, and accompanying them on patrols and opera-
tions) by nature demands a very long-term involvement. But if the EU’s help is
requested, it should not be stingy and engage at a significant enough level to make a
difference, in sufficient numbers and with enough budget. Furthermore, because
when actual war is ongoing, pending a political solution the EUGS commits the EU to
“protect human lives, notably civilians” and to “support and help consolidate local
ceasefires”. That entails deploying troops with serious firepower on the ground,
backed up by air support and ready reserves, who will not necessarily seek out and
destroy an opponent but who will fight when the civilians for whom they are respon-
sible are threatened. Without that determination, the EU will not have created a safe
zone but a trap – remember Srebrenica. For many Member States, land operations
with such a high potential of combat go far beyond anything that they have recently
undertaken, certainly in an autonomous European framework. It is vital therefore
that the implications of this task are spelled out in the white paper and fully taken on
board by the political and military leadership.
Third, to help maintain “sustainable access to the global commons”, which is directly
related to the EU’s vital interests. The EUGS announces multilateral diplomatic initi-
atives in key areas but also envisages a stepped up military contribution, especially
as a “global maritime security provider”, and with a specific focus on Asia. Here the
EU seeks “to make greater practical contributions” to security, including by helping
to build maritime capacities and supporting “an ASEAN-led regional security archi-
tecture”. The EU can engage in exchange of expertise, combined training and educa-
tion (notably via the European Security and Defence College), combined exercises
and manoeuvres, and actual combined patrolling and operations, with ASEAN for
example, and with strategic partners such as India, Japan, South Korea and China
itself. Such activities would not only create local capacity but have an important
confidence and security-building effect as well. This engagement thus also contrib-
utes to another objective of the EUGS: promoting cooperative regional orders in
sensitive areas. In this context, the proposal by French Defence Minister Jean-Yves
Le Drian, at the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, to coordinate a maritime5
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Increasing the visibility of the different European countries’ maritime presence by
putting them under the same flag can compensate for Europe’s loss of face, is the
best way of making the most of available means, and enhances a distinct European
presence that can promote specific European interests.
Fourth, “to assist further and complement UN peacekeeping”. As the EUGS proclaims
the maintenance of a rules-based global order, with the UN at the core, to be a vital
interest of the EU, Europeans must act when the UN decides the rules have been
broken. Whether Europeans deploy as blue helmets, under direct UN command, or
not is of secondary importance. The key thing is that when requested by the UN,
Europeans must demonstrate more solidarity more quickly, including in areas
outside Europe’s broad neighbourhood (such as the CSDP operation in the Central
African Republic in 2014-2015, though that also serves as an example of how
tortuous the EU force generation process can be).
These four tasks represent a clear increase in the burden placed on Europe’s armed
forces, for expeditionary operations as well as for support to “homeland security”.6
ON TO A WHITE PAPER AND A NEW HEADLINE GOAL
Assuring these tasks requires “full-spectrum land, air, space and maritime capabili-
ties, including strategic enablers”, as the EUGS states. What the EUGS does not do, is
to quantify these four military tasks and the desired concurrency: How many opera-
tions, of which size, should Europeans be able to undertake simultaneously, without
relying on non-European assets (as strategic autonomy demands)?
That is what the “sectoral strategy” on defence, which the EUGS envisages, should
now do, or the Strategic Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (SPIS) as the
High Representative subsequently re-baptized it in a September meeting of the Polit-
ical and Security Committee. What this really is, of course, is an EU defence white
paper. Not calling it that is another conscious cosmetic choice on the part of the High
Representative, just like dispersing defence throughout the EUGS, in order not to get
embroiled in debates over symbols at the risk of endangering the substance. As this
author need not worry about such niceties, this paper will henceforth simply refer to
a white paper.
An Ambitious Headline Goal
An example of desired concurrency, to be achieved in different phases by a certain
deadline, say 2030, could be:
• Long-term capacity-building efforts in several countries of the broader neigh-
bourhood.
• Long-term military cooperation activities with the EU’s strategic partners and
with regional architectures such as ASEAN, including a naval presence.
• 2 long-term brigade-size stabilization operations (either preventively or post-
conflict) in the broader neighbourhood.
• 2 long-term battalion-size contributions to UN stabilization operations (either
preventively or post-conflict) beyond the neighbourhood.
• 3 long-term naval operations (before, during or after a conflict) in the broader
neighbourhood.
• 1 Battlegroup-size evacuation operation of EU citizens, worldwide.
• 1 high intensity joint crisis management operation in the broader neighbour-
hood, of up to several brigades and/or squadrons.
In light of the crises in Europe’s neighbourhood (to the east and to the south) and the
global geopolitical tensions today, this level of ambition is none too high. It is but the
reflection of the rhythm of operations of the last decade, in which European armed
forces, under various flags, have been part of interventions in Afghanistan, the
Central African Republic, the Indian Ocean, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, the Mediter-
ranean, and Syria.7
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requirements as they are currently defined, i.e. the Headline Goal: the ability to
deploy and sustain up to 60,000 troops (that is, up to a corps) for at least one year.
Europe can deploy 60,000 troops – at times in the previous decade up to 80,000
troops from EU Member States were deployed – but not autonomously. It can do so
only if the US provides the strategic enablers. And de facto it also counts on the US
as the strategic reserve in case any deployment runs into serious trouble, for once
60,000 European troops are deployed, Europe will find itself scraping the bottom of
the barrel to send out any more.
As it not only increases the tasks for the military but expects them to undertake these
tasks autonomously as well, the EUGS obviously implies a new, more ambitious
Headline Goal. Definitely in terms of strategic enablers, as explicitly mentioned in the
EUGS (which emphasizes “Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, including
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, satellite communications, and autonomous
access to space and permanent earth observation”): Europeans should be able to
support the above level of concurrency with their own enablers. And in terms of
numbers as well: real autonomy implies the ability to deploy the equivalent of the
current Headline Goal over and above all ongoing operations listed above, so as to
ensure the availability of a strategic reserve in case one of them goes awry or an
additional crisis demands Europe’s attention.
Revising the Headline Goal should not be a taboo – the 60,000 only ever was an artifi-
cial number, based on the capability requirements of the past operations, in former
Yugoslavia. Revising it upwards, of course – but from the discourse the opposite
trend it evident. In recent years, many participants in the European defence debate
habitually talk as if the summit of European ambition is to have two battalion-size
Battlegroups on stand-by, with the Headline Goal well-nigh forgotten. In several
corners, the initial reaction to the Brexit is to simply subtract the British contribution
and to downsize the Headline Goal. Some have proposed a brigade-size force as the
focus of Europe’s ambition for strategic autonomy (Drent and Zandee, 2016).
The question must of course be asked: if the aim is EU strategic autonomy, without
the UK, is it realistic then to even maintain the current Headline Goal after the Brexit,
let alone increasing it?
For sure, the UK represents no less than 25% of the total defence expenditure of
$265 billion of the EU-28, and 10% of the total of 1.5 million troops.2 Moreover, the
very experienced British forces represent a major part of the European forces
employable for expeditionary operations. This issue of quality also appears from the
fact that the EU-28 today spend $175,000 per soldier and the EU-27 only $146,000.
If the British contribution is withdrawn from the EU’s Force Catalogue, it will create
2 All figures calculated from the relevant edition of The Military Balance (IISS).8
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States.3 On the other hand, the current Headline Goal was set in 1999, for a Union of
15 Member States, with 1.6 million troops (including a large share of conscripts) and
spending $160 billion on defence (and just $96,000 per soldier). A revised Headline
Goal will be a target for a Union of 27, still with 1.35 million troops (now mostly
volunteers) and a total defence expenditure of $200 billion.4 For the EU-27 there-
fore, at the very least, the current Headline Goal should remain eminently feasible.
But with such overall numbers even the “double Headline Goal” that the above
concurrency requires (the ability to deploy 50 to 60,000 troops supported by
European enablers only, while maintaining a deployable strategic reserve of as many
again) ought to be feasible, over time, on the condition that among the EU-27
defence integration is pushed much further (as we will see below).
Maintaining and, over time, even increasing the Headline Goal is the realist option
therefore: in view of what is necessary, looking at the world around Europe, but also
in view of what is possible, looking at Europe’s military potential. Realism not only
means not setting unachievable objectives – it also means not setting the bar too low
and underexploit the potential that is there.
UK Involvement
It is true that until now the engine of Europe’s expeditionary role was the Franco-
British axis. In a Union of 27 that will have to be a Franco-German axis, with France
becoming a bit more German and Germany a bit more French (Guéhenno, 2016).
France, the only remaining EU Member State with a global military-strategic outlook,
close to full spectrum forces, and the experience of a permanently high operational
rhythm, will have to reinvest in the EU. Germany will have to continue to pursue a
very active and ideally more comprehensive foreign policy, playing a leading role not
only in the eastern but also in the southern neighbourhood, and increasingly support
its diplomacy with a military expeditionary role. The deployment of 650 German
troops to Mali in 2016, under UN command, to a theatre of operations that is far
from risk-free, is a good example of the role that Germany can play. Actually, some
of the smaller EU Member States have in recent years contributed very actively to
crisis management operations – more than expected perhaps, which unfortunately
cannot be said of many medium-sized European countries. Actively assuming the
expeditionary role that the EUGS envisages will require more Member States to
come more fully on board.
3 It is not impossible that if the economic consequences of the Brexit are too negative, it will have an impact
on British defence expenditure, and planned capabilities will have to be downsized. This could potentially
greatly reduce the British contribution to European expeditionary operations even if satisfactory arrange-
ments are found for close coordination between the EU, NATO and all of their European members.
4 Denmark has an opt-out for the CSDP, but for the EU-26 the figures still are 1.33 million and $196 billion.9
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hood especially will remain as vital to the UK as to the EU. Hence, when Europeans
launch operations in the broader neighbourhood (under EU, NATO, UN or ad hoc
command, for as we shall see below an EU Headline Goal does not always mean EU
operations), Britain is more likely to be a part of them than not, even though post-
Brexit it is less likely to take the initiative itself. What for reasons of domestic politics
the UK will most probably not be able to do, is to formally associate itself with the
Headline Goal process. Nor will it likely be able, for the same reasons and at least for
some time to come, to join multinational capability projects under the EU-label or
deeper integration into permanent multinational units (which as we shall also see
below is the only way the EU-27 can achieve a new Headline Goal).
Formally therefore, the new Headline Goal can only aspire to EU strategic autonomy.
An assumption of the availability of British forces for actual operations is more than
justified however, so that in practice the EU white paper can at least define the possi-
bility of European strategic autonomy as part of the context in which it operates.
Drafting the White Paper
Writing the EU white paper is an eminently political task, for quantifying the military
tasks set by the EUGS is a matter of political choice, not of mathematics. Further-
more, buy-in from the Member States is as important for the white paper as for the
EUGS itself, for they will eventually have to acquire the capabilities and deploy them.
Defence establishments especially must sincerely commit. Rather than task the EU
administration to produce a draft and negotiate the text in the Political and Security
Committee, it seems advisable to follow an ad hoc procedure, just like for the EUGS.
Perhaps Member States can be invited to nominate a “plenipotentiary” who is
authorized to commit their foreign and defence ministries, to discuss a draft
produced by a small ad hoc drafting team outside the administrative structures,
including one or two senior military representatives. The opportunity for additional
debate can be created by organizing one or two seminars involving the expert
community and the non-EU members of NATO (including of course the UK).
The white paper need not be very long, nor therefore should it take a long time to
draft – it ought to be adopted in early 2017. Important is that it spells out the military
implications of the tasks set by the EUGS and provides a clear and quantified state-
ment of military ambition – a new Headline Goal. Subsequently, the EU Military Staff
(EUMS) can revisit the existing illustrative scenarios for European operations. The
existing scenarios focus on peace enforcement, peacekeeping, evacuation of EU
citizens, capacity-building, and supporting disaster relief. These can be updated by
incorporating the implications of tasks related to “homeland security” and counter-
terrorism; perhaps an additional maritime scenario can be envisaged. Then has to
follow a new iteration of the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), updating10
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UK), and shortfalls. This will take time, but immediately after the adoption of the
white paper, the European Defence Agency (EDA) can already update the Capability
Development Plan (CDP), which was foresee in 2017 anyway, and generate a first set
of capability priorities in order to link national and multinational efforts to the objec-
tive of strategic autonomy. These priorities can then be taken into account in NATO’s
defence planning as well.11
COMPLEMENTARITY AND FLEXIBILITY 
IN IMPLEMENTATION: EU-NATO
EU-NATO coordination will be of the essence. Simultaneously with the expeditionary
tasks outlined in the EUGS, Europeans must ensure collective defence and deter-
rence under NATO’s Article 5. In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, the Alliance is pushing
its members to fulfil their capability commitments with renewed vigour. For sure,
Europeans must step up their role, for today the credibility of Article 5 relies almost
entirely on the fact that the US is a member of NATO, which is hardly a healthy situa-
tion.
Hence NATO initiatives such as the brigade-size Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
(VJTF), which will deploy, in a rotating multinational composition, inside NATO’s
eastern borders. The capabilities from which the deployable VJTF rotations are
generated can also generate forces for non-Article 5 expeditionary operations (under
whichever command). When on stand-by for NATO however, a VJTF rotation will in
principle not be available for other tasks (though in a real crisis an Ally can always
recall its troops). Clearly, meeting the demands of both collective defence and a
(when necessary autonomous) European expeditionary role is a challenge, but both
are equally vital to the security of Europe.
Defence Planning
It is striking, actually, how little talk there is in NATO about expeditionary, “non-
Article 5” operations. The focus is strongly on Article 5 and the east and even in NATO
headquarters in Brussels one hears voices that the EU should take the lead in
addressing Europe’s southern neighbourhood. Furthermore, as the Americans have
repeatedly made clear, when Europeans take the initiative to deal with security
problems in the south, the US will support them – but Washington will no longer
automatically take the initiative for them.
The EU white paper is essential therefore, for only an EU white paper can answer the
question that NATO does not even pose: what exactly should Europeans be capable
of alone when necessary? The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) starts from
what the Alliance as a whole, including the non-EU Allies, should be capable of, and
translates that into capability targets for every individual Ally. There is no attempt to
ensure that the sum of the capabilities held by the Allies that are also EU Member
States alone (or by all European Allies alone, without the US, Canada and Turkey)
constitutes a coherent whole, capable of operations without having recourse to
assets of the others. In the area of strategic enablers especially, the US contributes
more than its share, so the spread of capabilities resulting from the NDPP cannot
guarantee European or EU strategic autonomy. Only if the next iteration of the NDPP12
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defined in the EU white paper can a capability mix be created that allows Europeans
to do all: to contribute to Article 5, to undertake non-Article 5 operations with the US
and the other non-EU Allies, and to launch autonomous expeditionary operations. In
the words of the EUGS: “European security and defence efforts should enable the EU
to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in coopera-
tion with NATO”.
Command and Control
It does not follow from this however that the military tasks set in the EUGS and
detailed in the EU white paper must necessarily always be undertaken under EU
command.
Obviously, Europeans can have but one “grand strategy” – they cannot have one
strategy when they meet in the EU and another when they gather in NATO. That
single European “grand strategy” is the EUGS, which addresses all dimensions of
external action, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military. To implement that
single strategy in the military sphere, Europeans have several instruments at hand
however: NATO, the CSDP, the UN, and ad hoc coalitions.
When it comes to the security of European territory itself, NATO assumes responsi-
bility for deterring and defending against classic military threats. The EU, as seen
above, is playing an increasing role in addressing so-called “hybrid” threats to
“homeland security” that fall short of war, as is NATO, and both organizations are
therefore closely coordinating.5 When it comes to expeditionary operations,
Europeans can choose the command and control arrangements that are best suited
to the crisis at hand. Strategic autonomy means acting without US assets, not
without NATO assets – for the NATO command structure is in large part staffed by
European personnel. The condition is that the availability of a NATO headquarters
can be guaranteed whenever Europeans need one; in this regard, the existing Berlin
Plus Agreement between the EU and NATO no longer is satisfactory. But the point is
that even when Europeans act alone, without the US (and other non-EU Allies), they
can launch a NATO operation, or they can opt for a CSDP operation or for an ad hoc
coalition, in both cases using either a national headquarters or a NATO headquarters,
or they can deploy under UN command. In all of these scenarios it will indeed increas-
ingly have to be Europeans acting alone in their neighbourhood, in view of the US
“pivot”.
Not in all of these cases will the EU be formally involved from the start. Europeans
can also take the initiative to launch an intervention in NATO, or in an ad hoc group
5 Hybrid tactics are, and always have been, part and parcel of warfare too, and hence included in both collec-
tive defence and expeditionary operations.13
ALL OR NOTHING? EUROPEAN AND BRITISH STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AFTER THE BREXIToutside either the EU or NATO, as for Mali and Libya. In most if not all cases though,
Europeans will de facto act in the broader context of EU foreign policy and the EUGS,
which shapes Europe’s relations with for example Mali and Libya, and Syria and Iraq,
and Russia and Ukraine. Even in NATO, it is the collective EU view on the future of
relations with the latter two countries that shapes the actions that the European
Allies are willing to take. And following the Brexit it is not unlikely that the European
Allies will increasingly speak with one voice in NATO, since of all EU Member States
the UK was always most opposed to this. Furthermore, it is the EU that has the instru-
ments and the budgets to make possible the long-term comprehensive involvement
in the political and economic sphere without which any military intervention in a
country is meaningless.
Britain’s Future Role
For the UK, the question is whether after the Brexit it wants to maintain the possi-
bility of participating in CSDP operations, for those cases where that appears the
most suitable operational framework. If the answer is yes, London could conclude an
agreement with the EU to that end. The UK has already indicated however that it
finds the existing agreements for third country participation in CSDP operations far
from satisfactory. But the more London is willing to offer, the greater the likelihood
of an enhanced agreement. The UK could agree, for example, that its operational
headquarters in Northwood, currently commanding the Atalanta naval operation,
remains available for future operations as well.
The UK would be well-advised however to also seek close association with EU foreign
policy and the overall implementation of the EUGS. For if Britain takes part in opera-
tions but not in the foreign policy that determines why operations are undertaken in
the first place, its role will be like that of Australia and New Zealand in NATO: a very
reliable troop contributor – with little or no voice in strategy. As part of the Brexit
negotiations, a novel arrangement can be imagined that gives Britain a seat, though
not a vote, in the Foreign Affairs Council for a specific range of topics.
Finally, a question for the UK and the EU Member States alike is whether it makes
sense, now that the UK can no longer position itself as the bridge between the Union
and the Alliance, that the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR), who
under the Berlin-Plus Agreement is ex officio operations commander for CSDP opera-
tions using a NATO headquarters, is always British. A rotational scheme with France
and Germany seems advisable, or the creation of an additional DSACEUR post.14
BUILDING EUROPEAN CAPABILITIES
Once the new Headline Goal is established, capability development should be accel-
erated. The EUGS has surprisingly much to say about how to go about this. The
overall principle is crystal-clear: “Member States will need to move towards defence
cooperation as the norm”. In practice, cooperation will have to be deepened at two
levels simultaneously: that of the EU, and that of clusters of Member States.
Strategic Enablers and the EU Level
At the EU level, the focus should be on strategic enablers, which demand the partic-
ipation of a large number of Member States to make any project economically viable,
in view of the large cost of development. The EUGS rightly puts a strong emphasis on
enablers, because in this area the EU as such can provide strong incentives: “Union
funds to support defence research and technologies and multinational cooperation,
and full use of the European Defence Agency’s potential”. Both of these are vital.
First, under the next framework programme for research (2021-2027), the European
Commission will, for the first time, provide significant funding (of at least €500
million) for defence research. The procedures for this initiative, which is a concrete
result of the December 2013 European Council meeting on defence, will shortly be
tested by a preparatory action. When the procedures are finalized, it is key that they
explicitly refer to the EU white paper and the resulting capability priorities as the
formal guidance for the use of these new funds under the framework programme, so
that they will directly contribute to the goal of strategic autonomy. Industry must
serve the Member States and their armed forces, not the other way around.
Second, the EDA will lose the British budgetary contribution, but at the same time
the UK will no longer be able to block a budget increase, so the remaining Member
States must now put their money where their mouths are. On the one hand, the
Commission can use its budget for defence research to co-finance research projects,
for up to 50% for example, thus stimulating the capitals to step up their own defence
research spending. The EDA, which the EUGS sees as “the interface between
Member States and the Commission”, can be the manager of all defence research
projects. Member States should also increase the EDA’s own budget, finally providing
it with the means to act of its own accord and launch feasibility studies and pilot
projects; until now, British objections had rendered this impossible. Moreover, there
should be no objections against Commission participation in actual capability
projects, beyond research. If, for example, a cluster of Member States embarks on a
project to build an observation drone, which various branches of the Commission
also require, the Commission could participate on the same level as the capitals,
paying its share of the cost and receiving (drawing rights on) its share of the15
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not fear that they lose control.
All of these instruments together make the EU the best available framework for
multinational capability projects. Only through the EU, furthermore, can European
countries ensure the defence industrial dimension of strategic autonomy: having a
European defence industry that can develop and produce all equipment that the new
Headline Goal requires. Just for capability projects geared to collective defence and
involving the non-European Allies, such as missile defence, is NATO the better frame-
work. The UK has never been an eager participant in European projects, but if the
development and production of European enablers takes off, it may find it to be in
its defence industrial interest to participate in specific projects. It could therefore
conclude an agreement with the EDA, like Norway, allowing it to take part in projects
on a case-by-case basis. For the EU, the advantage would be that British participation
in a project would make it easier to reach the critical mass to make it economically
feasible. First, however, the future of Britain’s access to the single market must be
settled.
Integrated Forces and the Cluster Level
At the level of clusters, Member States can implement the “gradual synchronisation
and mutual adaptation of national defence planning cycles and capability develop-
ment practices” that the EUGS calls for.
To this day, the national focus remains predominant in defence planning. States
draw up their national defence white paper or equivalent first, in splendid isolation
and without much regard for guidelines from either the EU or NATO. Only when that
is finalized do those who want to explore possibilities for cooperation with others,
but by then many opportunities have already been precluded by the national choices
that were made. The problem is that, with a few exceptions, this is how Europe has
ended up with a plethora of small national forces, which do not cover the full
spectrum of capabilities, which struggle to offer all support functions (logistics,
maintenance, training etc.) for the few capabilities that they do maintain, and from
which only small deployments can be generated.
The aim therefore should be to turn this around. States should stop doing national
force planning separately and then decide on which aspects they want to cooperate
with others. Instead, states should plan together, as if for one force, and then decide
which contribution every individual state will make to that single force (including by
participating in EU-level projects to acquire the strategic enablers on which the force
would have to rely).
Concretely, European states need to build permanent multinational formations with
dedicated multinational headquarters, such as army corps and air wings. To these16
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the support functions can be ensured by a combination of pooling (permanent multi-
national units) and specialization (a division of labour among participating
countries).6 As no longer every country has to contribute to every support function,
national spending will be less fragmented, substantial synergies and economies of
scale will be created, funds released for investment, and capabilities enhanced. As
manoeuvre units within the multinational formation are national, one participant
can flexibly deploy an infantry battalion, for example, without the others having to
follow suit. At the same time, the corps or wing should be seen as the framework of
choice to generate all larger-scale European deployments, so that countries do
defence planning, capability development and operations in the same multinational
framework. Today, the many existing multinational formations seldom or never
deploy as such, which is one of the reasons why the degree of integration within each
remains limited.
Ideally, once acquired, strategic enablers would also be managed on a similar multi-
national basis. European Air Transport Command (EATC) already does this for the
transport fleet of the participating countries. It could easily be broadened (bringing
in more Member States) and deepened (extending the cooperation to pooled logis-
tics and maintenance), and can serve as a model for other capability areas.
There are different routes to pursue this deeper integration in clusters. The most
obvious one perhaps, for that was exactly its purpose, would be to activate Perma-
nent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the hitherto unused mechanism introduced
by the Lisbon Treaty. That would imply agreeing on how to quantify the criteria for
participation listed in the Treaty. As the decision to establish PESCO is taken by a
qualified majority of all Member States, a sufficient number of those not partici-
pating must agree as well. Another way would be to create new clusters outside the
Treaty and/or build on existing ones, such as the Eurocorps (which has evolved in the
opposite direction: from a corps with units assigned to it, it became a headquarters
only). It might be easier to avoid the debate about criteria and to find consensus in
several clusters outside the Treaty, instead of on a single PESCO addressing all
capability areas.
Yet a third way would be to build on NATO’s Framework Nations Concept (FNC): one
or more larger countries offer the framework, such as a force or a headquarters, in
which a number of smaller countries plug in with specific contributions, in order to
achieve together the capability targets set by the NDPP (Ruiz Palmer, 2016). Three
FNC groups have been established so far. A German-led group of 16 started out by
focusing on capability development (with sub-groups of various sizes addressing
6 Belgian-Dutch naval cooperation is an example, at a smaller scale, of how this works in practice: both coun-
tries contribute frigates and minehunters sailing under their own flag with their own crew, but there is only
one binational headquarters and one operational school (pooling), while the Netherlands is in charge of
training, logistics and maintenance for the frigates and Belgium for the minehunters (specialization).17
ALL OR NOTHING? EUROPEAN AND BRITISH STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AFTER THE BREXITspecific capability areas), and is now also used as a framework to generate temporary
multinational formations, notably to deploy to the east in the context of NATO. A UK-
led group of 7 focuses on deployment, through participation by the others in the
British Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). An Italian-led group of 6 focuses on stabiliza-
tion and reconstruction operations. It should be noted that France is not a member
of either group.
Whichever route, or a combination thereof, is chosen: real synergies, thus real
savings, thus additional capability, will only result from effective integration. That
demands that a number of conditions be fulfilled:
(1) Within every group, participating countries must exploit all opportunities for
pooling and specialization of support functions to the maximum and adapt their
national defence planning to the commonly agreed capability objectives, without
any taboos. This means doing away with any existing or envisaged national capa-
bility that turns out to be redundant. Only a very few of the many existing bi- and
multinational cooperation initiatives have already reached this stage – and the
FNC groups are not among them, nor is the Eurocorps.
(2) The savings thus generated must be reinvested in commonly agreed multina-
tional capability projects, in order to harmonize equipment across the cluster.
Like the projects to acquire strategic enablers, these projects can be managed by
the EDA.
(3) The membership of the various clusters must be consolidated and their objec-
tives de-conflicted. As it is, several countries participate in two FNC groups for
example, plus in other clusters, which are overlapping in terms of the capability
areas that they cover. Any given national capability can cooperate with several
clusters, but it can be integrated into a cluster only once.
(4) Finally, whichever format is chosen, integration will eventually demand a legally
binding international agreement between the participating countries that states
who contributes what, in order to guarantee that each will continue to finance his
agreed contribution over time, and as a safeguard against national budget cuts.
That agreement will also have to define the procedures for deployment on actual
operations. The starting point of cooperation is trust, but integration requires
guarantees. Otherwise, a model like the FNC, while avoiding the debate about
PESCO-like criteria, risks ending up like the EU’s European Capability Action Plan
(ECAP) of the early 2000s: voluntary participation in working groups per capa-
bility area led only to the voluntary absence of any results.
Thinking prospectively, one can imagine a future grand scheme in which the German
FNC group merges with the Eurocorps. This would bring in France and Spain, and
consolidate German-Dutch and German-Polish cooperation into the same frame-
work. Together with the British and Italian FNC groups, a northern, central and18
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terms as well, representing a Franco-German axis that is already emerging in capa-
bility development and that can expand into foreign policy and expeditionary opera-
tions. In the framework of an NDPP that incorporates the EU ambition of strategic
autonomy, as outlined above, these three main clusters would each focus on building
the large deployable formations from which both VJTF rotations and expeditionary
operations can be generated. Each could include sub-clusters of two or three that
together contribute a capability to the main cluster.
Alongside the three main clusters, there would be big clusters managing certain
strategic enablers, such as EATC, and perhaps in the future a satellite or an ISTAR
cluster. And there would of course remain a number of national formations,
especially those geared to territorial defence, including the remaining conscript and
militia-type units. That the FNC, PESCO-esque as it is, has been established in the
context of NATO would not prevent any FNC group from making full use of the
Commission and the EDA to help fund and manage any capability projects on which
it decides (which requires, obviously, that the participants are either EU Member
States or have an agreement with the EDA). The northern UK-led group would
include most of the countries least interested in integration among themselves or in
participation in EDA projects, but could always jump on the waggon when their inter-
ests compel them to – which eventually they probably will. The Franco-German
cluster on the other hand could in time solidify its commitment by transforming itself
into PESCO.
Such more “structured” cooperation is in the air, witness the FNC itself (initially
proposed by Germany in 2013), Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s ideas
on a “European army” in 2015 (Balzi, 2015), and more recently the plea by the French
and German foreign ministers for a “European Security Compact” (Ayrault and Stein-
meier, 2016), and by the Italian foreign and defence ministers for a “Schengen on
defence” (Gentiloni and Pinotti, 2016). Rather more surprisingly, Poland and
Hungary called for a European army too even as overall they want the EU to return
power to the Member States (Zalan, 2016). Think-tank reports about defence
integration also receive more resonance these days than before.7
The EU as such can facilitate such a process leading to more cooperation, but only
the Member States themselves can initiate it. They need not wait to do so until the
new Headline Goal has been translated into detailed requirements and a new CDP,
for that will take time, and the EU should avoid the impression that the EUGS has just
engendered another paper tiger. Rather a group of Member States should take the
initiative as soon as the EU white paper is finished. At that point, two simultaneous
processes should thus take off: while the EU institutions prepare a new iteration of
7 For example Andersson et al. (2016) and Blockmans and Faleg (2015).19
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should immediately announce the start of closer military integration between them,
in order to demonstrate a number of shorter term results.
Peer Pressure and Assessment
The EUGS itself expresses the need for more structured forms of cooperation, stating
that “the voluntary approach to defence cooperation must translate into real
commitment”. Hence it calls for “an annual coordinated review process at EU level
to discuss Member States’ military spending plans” – what, in an earlier draft, was
called “a European semester on defence” – adding that “regular assessments of EDA
benchmarks can create positive peer pressure among Member States”. An annual EU
defence review should make sure to add value however to the NDPP process, which
already provides for a systematic review of Allied contributions on the basis of a 4-
year cycle. In terms of substance, an EU defence review could focus on strategic
autonomy, analysing EU Member States’ capabilities in terms of what it allows
Europeans to do alone, and on defence cooperation, analysing to which extent
Member States pool their efforts through EDA projects and in various clusters – and
what it has cost Europe if they haven’t. The EU could notably analyse every national
defence white paper from this angle. For peer pressure to be most effective, the
results of such a review should at least in part be a public document, like an EU
defence yearbook. If that task is indeed entrusted to the EDA, it will require
additional staff, however.20
CONCLUSION
If one were to start from scratch, one would never create the European security
architecture that exists today, in which grand strategy, defence planning, capability
development and operations take place in different constellations and in different
organizations, often at the same time. The Brexit will certainly not make it any easier
to make this architecture work, as one of the most important military actors volun-
tarily withdraws from a key part of the architecture. Be that as it may, in the current
strategic environment of instability in the neighbourhood and with the US increas-
ingly focusing on Asia, the remaining EU Member States have no choice but to pursue
the strategic autonomy that the EUGS has rightly put on top of the agenda.
This can work for all: European strategic autonomy, with the UK included, is still
possible. If, that is, Britain can find its usual pragmatism again, and is willing to
associate with EU institutions and to join structured multinational cooperation
whenever that is the best way of getting things done. For surely those who voted for
Brexit did not vote for the undermining of Europe’s security. If ideology and emotions
are allowed to continue to trump pragmatism however, the UK will discover that in
some areas neither the US nor NATO is likely to take the lead, and nothing much can
be achieved without European cooperation. Where will that leave Britain? In a worse
position, alas, than the remaining EU Member States, for the absence of British
engagement would be a serious obstacle to, but not the end, of European defence.
If truly European defence really is what the others want. This author will assume that
all the assertions from different quarters about the need for more cooperation are
to be taken very seriously.21
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